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Introduction
The editorial board of this journal and its principals should be congratulated for
furthering the Rhodes editorial initiative of exposing the Joumal's readership to the
evolution of social science theoretical paradigms applied to cooperative organizational
objectives and structural forms. Our objective in this briefreaction to Royer's description
of the neo-institutional digest of cooperative organizational strategies is to address the
application section of his paper. Our approach (1) briefly identifies Royer's contributions
to the Rhodes initiative, (2) extends and expands the discussion of Royer's application of
new institutional economics to cooperative organizational issues, (3) clarifies a number of
points made in the Royer paper, and (4) leverages a number of Royer's arguments and
observations into advancing a set ofpotential research topics.
Royer's Contribution
Royer makes two significant contributions to the field: (1) he provides a brief
overview of three of the neo-institutional paradigms used in the current discussion of
theories of the firm, and (2) he demonstrates how difficult it is to move from theory to
application in an evolving theoretical field. Royer's first contribution is analyzed and
discussed in the companion reaction paper by Sykuta and Chaddad, and we expand on
his second contribution-the interface between theory and application.
Extending Royer's Work
Royer's introductory review of the application of new institutional economics' (NIE)
to the cooperative organizational form leaves space for further analysis of the involved
issues and, additionally, a review of some critical references missing in his paper. Areas
amenable to a more sophisticated discussion'include:
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1. An explicit demonstration of the relationship between the neo-institutional
theories ofthe firm and the cooperative organizational form.
The discussion of the application of transaction cost economics to agricultural
cooperatives is limited to a single characteristic oftransactions (asset specificity) and only
one version of the hold-up problem. A further contribution in this area could be the
exploration of the differences between alternative theoretical paradigms (e.g., neo-
institutional economics vs. neoclassical economics) by means of a real world example.
This exercise should also incorporate other characteristics of transactions (e.g., duration,
frequency, etc.) and their impact on the choice of a transaction cost-minimizing
governance structure.
Additionally, a distinction must be made between the "traditional" property rights
approach (e.g., Alchian 1961; Furubotn and Pejovich 1972; De Alessi 1990) and the
property rights-incomplete contracts theories (e.g. Grossman and Hart 1986; Hart and
Moore 1990; Hart 1995). Hart and Moore (1998) introduced an application of the latter
framework to the study of cooperatives, which is not discussed by Royer. The
incomplete contracts approach defines the ownership of an asset as the possession of
residual control rights over the asset. On the other hand, the existing theoretical and
empirical literature on the five vaguely defined property rights (VDPR) problems uses the
traditional property rights approach,2 in which ownership is synonymous to the
possession of residual claims. Without this distinction the reader is led to believe that the
VDPR problems were analyzed in the literature by application of the incomplete contracts
framework rather than the traditional property rights approach.
2. Inclusion of several critical references focusing on applications of neo-
institutional economics to cooperatives.
Royer's review of the literature on applications of NIE to cooperatives does not
include several references that enhance a reader's understanding of the interaction
between economic theory and cooperative practice. In this section we briefly introduce
this research while in the last part of the paper we extend our discussion to more recent
theoretical and empirical work on the application of the property rights approach to
cooperatives.
Bonus analyzed the characteristics of the transaction between farmer-members and
their cooperatives and reached the conclusion that the latter represent a hybrid
organizational mode blending market forces with elements of internal organization
designed to minimize transaction costs. According to Bonus, the main benefits of
collective organization derived by cooperatives are achieved by internalizing crucial
transactions into a firm jointly owned by the owners of transaction-specific resources,
who thereby avoid potential threats to the quasi-rent of their investment by outside
opportunists. However, inside opportunism is imminent. As Bonus argues:
In the past, a set of dependable inner rules governing the cooperative's policies-
which was termed the 'cooperative spirit'-was sufficient to check this [inside
opportunism]. Such spirit tends to erode, however, as cooperative associations
grow large. Consequently, agency problems turn up that call for protective
institutional arrangements. (Bonus 1986: 196)
Another reference not discussed in Royer's review is Condon (1987, 1990), who has
established the incorporation of property rights considerations in cooperative theory as a
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Vitaliano's work in the early 1980s would also enhance Royer's description.
Particularly in his 1985 paper, Vitaliano discusses some of the five property rights
constraints and places them into a neo-institutional theoretical context. Condon and
Vitaliano's (1983) collaboration also provides us with unique insights into the cause of
the VDPR problems. Most of this work is summarized in Staatz's (1987c) review of
developments in cooperative theory.
Hansmann (1988,1996) proposes a transaction cost theory of ownership and uses his
framework to study alternative organizational arrangements and governance structures,
including agricultural cooperatives. He argues that alternative institutional arrangements
have emerged in an effort by decision makers to minimize the transaction costs of
ownership and contractual relationships. Hetherington is another author who studies
alternative ownership structures, under a law and economics perspective. His analysis
inevitably focuses on institutions and their role in promoting organizational efficiency.
Hart and Moore (1998) construct a formal model that attempts to explain the
observed diversity in ownership structures. Specifically, they design an optimal ex ante
allocation of residual rights of control and residual claimant rights by focusing on two
polar alternatives: the non-profit cooperative firm and the investor-owned firm (IOF).
The two main results of this study are: (1) in the case of perfect competition, an outside
owner achieves the first-best, while (2) the cooperative is the optimal ownership structure
when its members have common preferences and/or the market cannot be assumed to be
perfect.
There is also a growing theoretical and empirical literature on new generation
cooperatives (e.g., Cook and Tong 1997; Johnson 1996). In this literature this new form
of agricultural collective action is defined by the major characteristics of its property
rights structure: (1) transferable equity shares, (2) appreciable equity shares, (3) defined
membership, (4) legally binding delivery contract or a uniform grower agreement, and
(5) minimum up-front equity investment requirement (Cook and Tong 1997).
3. A more sophisticated analysis of the five vaguely defined property rights
problems in Royer's work would enhauce basic understanding ofthe cooperative
organizational stmcture.
Royer's neoclassical strength is demonstrated convincingly in his discussion of the
efficiency issue and empirical work focusing on the cooperative firm. However, the
effectiveness of empirical studies on the comparative efficiency of 10F and agricultural
cooperatives might be enhanced if a "production economics" mentality is avoided and all
relevant institutional constraints are incorporated by using measures of efficiency that
capture the real differences between the various types of cooperative institutional
arrangements.
This, in turn, requires that a N1E theoretical framework be constructed suitable to the
study of the real causes and consequences of potential differences in efficiency between
alternative instituti.onal arrangements. Additi.onally, the hypothesized negative impact of
the VDPR problems on cooperative efficiency must be empirically tested. With respect to
this, it is not only a comparison of efficiency between 10Fs and cooperatives that is
important, but also a contrast of efficiency between alternative cooperative property
rights structures.
Developing a N1E theoretical framework is also useful for identifying alternative
solutions to the five VDPR problems. Many traditional cooperatives have already
recognized the importance of clearly defined property rights and have adopted numerous
solutions (Cook and lliopoulos 1998).80 Journal of Cooperatives 1999
Another issue that requires a more extensive review of the literature is the control
problem. Royer presents theoretical arguments that the principal-agent problem may be
more serious in cooperatives than in IOFs due to the absence of a secondary market for
residual claims. While only empirical work will shed light on this issue, other scholars
argue that in cooperatives of relatively small size, characterized by singleness of purpose
and homogeneous membership (in terms of individual members' interests), the control
problem may be less serious than in IOFs of comparable size. Cooperative board
members have both the opportunity and a vital interest to closely monitor management
since in most cases the cooperative accounts for the principal component of their income
(Hansmann 1996).
The external free rider problem should also be addressed. There exists a vast
economic literature on this issue, most recently represented by Olson, Hardin, Sandler,
and many others. The external free rider problem is created whenever a cooperative
provides its members with collective goods characterized by de facto unfeasibility of
exclusion; "they must be available to everyone if they are available to anyone" (Olson
1971, 14). The result is usually no or suboptimal provision of these goods. However,
during the last three decades economists have recognized that some groups do provide
themselves with collective goods and, subsequently, focus has shifted toward
understanding the conditions under which the external free rider problem is ameliorated.
The early simple models gave way to more sophisticated ones, and empirical work has
been extended to the study of the problem in many alternative settings. Sandler (1992)
gives a comprehensive review of both theoretical and empirical studies on the issue.
The portfolio problem is probably one of the most difficult when it comes to
understanding all its possible manifestations. Cooperative decisions over the level of
investment risk assumed have a significant impact on many critical areas, including
cooperative finance, members' investment incentives, and resource and cost allocation
(Iliopoulos 1998). The adoption of separate equity capital pools by multi-purpose
cooperatives is an attempt by these organizations to combat the negative consequences of
this constraint (Cook and Iliopoulos 1998).
Some Technical Issues
A clarification on some of the issues presented in Royer's work is needed to avoid
misunderstanding the involved concepts. For example, the discussion of Balbach (1998)
in the section on the application of transaction cost economics to cooperatives seems out
of place since it is not clear to the reader whether Balbach uses any transaction cost
argument. Additionally, the discussion of the control problem leads to the conclusion
that cooperative managers can only be motivated through some stock options plan.
During the last twenty years, the principal-agent literature has given us a wide array of
alternative solutions, some ofwhich can be found in Eisenhardt (1989).
A related issue is the skillfulness of farmers to serve on the boards of complex
organizations and the failure of cooperatives to include outside board members that
would enhance members' ability to effectively monitor management. While it is true that
in the past farmers were not always prepared for the complexities of businesses other
than farming (not that these are minor), the industrialization and concentration of
agriculture, which significantly increase the level of skills and formal education required
by farmers, tend to make this observation obsolete (Hetherington 1991). Additionally,
there are many cooperatives that do employ outside directors specializing in fields such
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Also, Royer states that "presumably, these monitoring costs are lower for cooperative
growers because, as owners of the processor, they have greater trust in the
measurements." This is a generalization that does not take into consideration the effects
of the influence costs problem, especially in multi-purpose/multi-commodity
cooperatives. In his detailed study of U.S. agricultural cooperatives, Hetherington
observed that, for large, multi-commodity cooperatives, there is a high degree of conflict
over grading of the various crops of different subgroups of members. To avoid these
inter-cooperative conflicts, boards and managers have routinely used an outside company
to grade members' crops.
The importance of the influence costs problem justifies further discussion. Influence
activities in an IOF can be observed in the efforts of the various within-the-IOF divisions
to claim a higher percentage of the company's resources. Besides similar employee
influence activities, in cooperatives individual members or groups of members attempt to
influence decision makers to their benefit. Thus, influence costs are presumably higher
in cooperatives than in IOFs of comparable size. For example, a national supply
cooperative considering an investment in a fertilizer plant may incur higher influence
costs than an IOF as members try to affect the decision over the location of the plant in
order to minimize, among other, their individual transportation costs.
In the discussion of Harte's life cycle model, there is no distinction between different
types of cooperatives. The general statement, "Cooperatives would be expected to persist
indefinitely only in the case of chronic market failure" fails to capture the difference
between defensive (Nourse) and offensive (5apiro) cooperatives. Nourse's philosophy of
cooperation posits that the need for a cooperative exists only as long as there is a market
failure. On the other hand, 5apiro proposed an offensive cooperative aiming at increasing
its members' market share. The latter type of cooperative is not necessarily formed to
address market failures.
Royer's conclusion that both Cook and Harte's life cycle models "... inexorably lead to
dissolution or conversion" of cooperatives is inconsistent with his discussion of Cook's
life cycle model, where much time is spent on the "continuing" option. Additionally, all
subsequent work by Cook and his colleagues on expanding the "continuing" option has
suggested that NIE approaches are useful in identifying how traditional cooperatives can
ameliorate the structural flaws and consequent organizational inefficiencies of vaguely
defined property rights (e.g., Cook and Tong 1997, Iliopoulos and Cook 1999, Cook and
Iliopoulos 1998). In this sense, these authors' findings are far from dismal but rather
quite optimistic as to the future of independent producer owned and controlled
organizations.
NIE and Cooperatives: A New Research Agenda
The recognition of institutions as important determinants of economic effiCiency has
already created the basis for several applications of NIE to the cooperative organizational
form. The above discussion and extension of Royer's literature review shows the timing
and relevance of the involved issues to cooperative decision makers and scholars. A new
research agenda has already started taking shape. Critical issues addressed by this new
conceptual paradigm might include:
1. Creation of a formal NIE framework for studying the five VDPR problems, their
consequences, and possible solutions.82 Journal of Cooperatives 1999
2. Empirical inquiry into the effect of the VDPR problems on members' investment
incentives and the efficiency of cooperative decision making especially in large,
complex business organizations.
3. Construction of a dynamic life cycle model of cooperatives, able to explain the
successes, growth, failures, and continuances of collective action organizations in
agriculture over time. .
4. In-depth study of possible solutions to the VDPR problems and empirical work on
the effectiveness of these solutions under various institutional environments.
5. Theoretical and empirical work on the external free rider issue, especially in Sapiro I,
bargaining cooperatives, a form of collective action that becomes more and more
important to farmers as agribusiness markets become increasingly concentrated.
6. How do alternative modes of collective decision making in cooperatives affect the
potential for success of cooperative business firms, especially in markets where
existing preferences are unknown?
7. Is the cooperative the most efficient governance structure when a transaction
requires idiosyncratic investments on both sides of the exchange but with different
economies of scale?
8. More generally, what characteristics of transactions dictate the formation of
cooperatives in agriculture so that transaction costs are minimized?
9. How do alternative risk-sharing institutional arrangements within cooperatives affect
their potential to capture significant rents in industries where relational contracts are
the norm?
10. What combinations of public and private goods could be optimally provided by the
cooperative to its members?
11. How is technology adaptation affecting the choice of cooperative organizational
form, especially when transactions are characterized by asset specificity?
12. What is the role of reputation and quality assurance with respect to farmers' choice
to vertically integrate via cooperative firms, compared to other networking forms, to
internalize externalities imposed on them by their trading partners?
13. What is the role of cooperatives in redistributing residual control rights in the
farmers' favor?
14. How is the amelioration of the five VDPR problems affecting producers' incentives to
invest in their cooperative and support the most efficient collective decisions?
Applications of Neo-institutional Economics to Cooperatives: Recent
Research
The task of answering these questions is enormously difficult. However, there are
several studies that do address some of these issues at both the theoretical and empirical
levels. Most of this work was discussed above (i.e., Condon 1987, 1990; Vitaliano 1985;
Hansmann 1996; Hetherington 1991; Hart and Moore 1990, 1998; Cook and Tong
1997; Bonus 1986). In addition, recent works include:
1. Hackman and Cook (1997): A neo-institutional analysis of the public policy issues
concerning the transition of traditional to new cooperative organizational forms.
2. Hackman and Cook (1998): A study of the institutional factors and property rights
characteristics of cooperative firms with an emphasis on their impact on the choices
of global strategies cooperatives pursue in their attempts to become agri-food chain
leaders.The Internal Organization ofthe Cooperative Firm 83
3. Cook and Iliopoulos (1998): An analysis of the alternative solutions adopted by
traditional U.S. agricultural cooperatives to ameliorate the five VDPR problems.
4. Iliopoulos (1998): This study formalizes a property rights theoretical framework for
studying the VDPR problems and focuses on the analysis of the free rider, horizon,
and portfolio problems (investment constraints). Also, it empirically tests a series of
hypotheses generated during the last fifteen years (Staatz 1987a, 1987b; Vitaliano
1985; Condon 1990; Cook 1995; Porter and Scully 1987; Hansmann 1996;
Hetherington 1991; and others) by application of NIE concepts to the cooperative
firm.
As Royer points out, much more work needs to be accomplished, both in theory and
in hypotheses testing in order to understand the internal organization of the cooperative
firm or, as Coase would have put it, the nature of the cooperative firm. NIE provides us
with powerful theories and tools to achieve this goal and build a comprehensive and
empirically tested theory of the cooperative firm. There is no excuse for adhering to
paradigms unable to explain the most intriguing and thus most interesting aspects of the
unique cooperative organizational form.
Notes
1. The differences between neo- and new institutional economics are discussed in the companion
reaction by Sykuta and Chaddad, elsewhere in this publication. While the reader should be aware
of these differences, for ease of exposition we use the term "New Institutional Economics"
throughout the paper.
2. Both the traditional and the incomplete contracts property rights approaches, however, center
on the notion that efficient use of an asset dictates alignment of residual claims and residual control
rights over the asset.
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